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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS IN THE COMMISSIONERS1 BRIEF, 
THE SUBSTANCE AND STRUCTURE OF TITLES 7 AND 7OB CLEARLY SHOW 
THAT THE COMMISSIONERS1 DUTIES TO INVESTIGATE, EXAMINE 
AND SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS 
Utah Code Ann, §§ 7-1-7; 7-1-8; 7-1-26(1); 7-1-26(6); 7-
2-1; and 7-3-3 show that from the day a financial institution seeks 
to begin a banking business, to the day it is merged or closed, the 
criteria for each important decision required of the commissioners 
hinges upon whether the depositors are protected. Thus, Title 7 
shows a clear intent to protect the depositors. 
Further, Title 70B did not change or repeal the commissioners' 
duties set forth in Title 7. What Title 7OB did do is enlarge the 
duty of the commissioners to investigate, examine and supervise 
Grove Finance. 
POINT II 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IS 
CONSIDERED AS A FORM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR AS AN 
ELEMENT IN A NEGLIGENCE CASE, THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
BAR THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS 
A disciplined review of Utah case law shows that this 
court's acceptance of the Public Duty Doctrine is based upon 
sovereign immunity rather than a negligence analysis. The Public 
Duty Immunity was repealed by Utah's Governmental Immunity Act as 
it existed when this action was filed. 
1 
Further, negligence analysis shows that the commission-
ers1 had a duty to the depositors to excimine, investigate and 
supervise Grove Finance• 
POINT III 
GOOD FAITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR 
THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS 
At the time the depositors filed this action, Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Statute had repealed the common law forms of 
sovereign immunity. The statutory section the commissioners rely 
upon was not passed until one year after the depositors sued the 
commissioners. Further, if the commissioners were grossly 
negligent, then by definition, they did not act in good faith. 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NO GROUNDS 
FOR DENYING CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
The filing of this litigation as a class action tolls the 
statute of limitations for unnamed members of the class. Therefore, 
the claims of the unnamed defendants are not barred. It was clear 
error for the lower court to deny class action certification on the 
erroneous belief that the claims were time barred. 
POINT V 
THE DEPOSITORS MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
REQUIRED BY RULE 23 
Rule 23, U.R.C.P. only requires the depositor to plead or 
otherwise establish the class action facts set forth in Rule 23. 
2 
The depositors did so. The commissioners did not contest the class 
action facts in the lower court proceedings. The depositors met 
the burden required by Rule 23. 
POINT VI 
RES JUDICATA IS NO BASIS FOR DENYING 
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
The application of Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P. 2d 405 (Utah 
1989) and res judicata do not bar the class claims of the unnamed 
depositors because the parties in Hilton and in this action are 
different. Further, the claims brought against Borthick and 
Brimhall as individuals were not litigated in Hilton, nor should 
they have been litigated in Hilton. 
POINT VII 
THE ISSUES CONCEDED OR NOT BRIEFED BY THE 
COMMISSIONERS REQUIRE A REVERSAL 
The commissioners conceded or failed to brief approxi-
mately eight issues raised in the Depositors1 Brief. The issues 
not responded to by the commissioners require reversal of the lower 
courtfs summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The appellants are 11 depositors who lost their savings 
in the Grove Finance Co. ("Grove Finance"). The depositors sued 
3 
Department of Financial Institutions commissioners Brimhall and 
Borthick, as individuals, for gross negligence. 
This is not the first appeal in this litigation. In 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1989), (referred to as 
"Madsen II" in Appellants1 Brief and hereinafter), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that these depositors could sue Brimhall and Borthick 
for gross negligence. The court ruled that the depositors1 claims 
against Borthick and Brimhall are not barred by any statute of 
limitations nor by governmental immunity. 
On remand, the lower court committed three fundamental 
errors. First, even though Madsen II held that the depositors 
could sue Borthick and Brimhall, the lower court granted Borthickfs 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Second, Madsen II held that 
the statute of limitations did not bar claims against Brimhall. 
The lower court, contrary to Madsen II, ruled that the statute of 
limitations barred the depositors1 claims against Brimhall and 
granted his motion for summary judgment. Finally, the lower court 
refused to certify this case as a class action even though it meets 
the criteria of Rule 23, U.R.C.P. 
The depositors1 opening brief raised numerous issues 
which can be grouped into four categories as follows: 
A. Whether claims against Brimhall are barred by any 
statute of limitations. 
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B. Whether the commissioners can be sued by the 
depositors for gross negligence. 
C. Whether common law good faith immunity bars the 
depositors1 claims against the commissioners. 
D. Whether the lower court erred in refusing to certify 
this case as a class action. 
The appellees, in their brief, failed to respond to the 
following issues raised in appellants1 opening brief: 
1. Madsen II held that none of the statutes of 
limitation urged by Brimhall bar the depositors' 
claims. 
2. A special relationship exists between the 
commissioners and Grove Finance which created a 
duty to depositors. 
3. Res judicata precludes the commissioners from 
raising the public duty defense. 
4. Whether the commissioners performed their statutory 
duties honestly and in good faith is a fact 
question which precludes judgment on the pleadings. 
5. This litigation meets the class action criteria of 
Rule 2 3 and the lower court erred when it 
considered issues outside Rule 23. 
6. The depositors did not seek to consolidate this 
case with another case. It was error for the lower 
5 
court to consider possible consolidation as a basis 
to deny class action certification. 
7. It was error to deny class certification without 
stating the reasons for the decision. 
The depositors1 reply brief responds to the arguments raised by the 
commissioners and argues that the respondents1 silence on issues 
raised in the appellants1 opening brief requires reversal of the 
trial court's judgments. 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS IN THE COMMISSIONERS1 BRIEF, 
THE SUBSTANCE AND STRUCTURE OF TITLES 7 AND 7OB CLEARLY SHOW 
THAT THE COMMISSIONERS' DUTIES TO INVESTIGATE, EXAMINE AND 
SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS 
A. Introduction. 
The commissioners' thesis is that: 
Titles 7 and 70B were not designed to protect 
appellants [depositors]. Title 7 plainly 
declares that its purpose is to protect the 
general public rather than particular individ-
uals. (Appellees1 Brief p. 14.) 
The commissioners rely solely on Section 7-1-3 (1979 
Supp.) which requires the commissioners to make a report on 
"matters that may be of interest to the public." Section 7-1-3 is 
not a sound basis for arguing that Title 7 duties do not run to the 
depositors. The substance and the structure of Title 7 and Title 
7OB show a clear intent to protect the depositors. 
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B. Title 7. 
In 1981, the Utah legislature repealed most of Title 7 
and replaced it with the Financial Institution Act of 1981. 
Citations to Title 7 and Title 70B in this brief and the depositors 
opening brief are to the laws existing in 1980, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
Whether an institution conducts a banking business 
subject to the regulation of the commissioners depends entirely 
upon whether the institution is "holding itself out to the public 
as receiving money in deposit whether evidenced by a certificate, 
promissory note or otherwise. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-3. If 
depositors existed, regulation was triggered by the act. 
A financial institutions articles of incorporation could 
only be approved by the commissioner if the commissioner found the 
incorporation "will be honestly conducted in accordance with law 
and for the best interest of the . . . depositors of the institu-
tion. ..." Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-26(1). Also, financial institu-
tion mergers could only be approved if "necessary to protect 
depositors. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-26(6). Moreover, Section 
7-1-8 required the commissioners to annually conduct a financial 
examination of the institution. A primary purpose was to determine 
"whether or not it is complying with its articles of incorporation. 
. . ." i.e., conducting its business in such a way as to "protect 
the depositors". Finally, the commissioners could take over the 
7 
institution if the institution was unable to timely pay its 
depositors, Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1. 
In summary, from the day a financial institution began a 
banking business to the day the institution merged or closed, the 
criteria for each critical decision required of the commissioner 
hinged upon whether the depositors were protected. The substance 
and structure of Title 7 clearly shows an intent to protect 
depositors. 
C. Title 70B. 
The commissioners contend that the Title 7OB duty to 
examine, investigate and supervise Grove Finance does not run to 
the depositors. (Appellees1 Brief p. 15.) The commissioners 
incorrectly assume that Title 7 does not apply and that Title 7OB 
should not be applied in conjunction with Title 7. 
The commissioners are the administrators under both Title 
7 (banking laws) and 70B (the UCCC) . Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-1 et 
seq. ; § 70B-6-103. The drafters of Title 70B recognized that 
certain financial institutions were subject to, and regulated by, 
both Title 7 and Title 70B. 
Many transactions are subject both to this Act 
and to other bodies of law. (Comment of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws § 70B-3-501) 
(hereinafter "Comment Section ,f) . 
One such financial institution was Grove Finance. Grove 
Finance was subject to Title 7 because it conducted a banking 
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business. Because Grove conducted a banking business, it was 
defined as a "supervised financial organization" under Title 70B: 
(17) Supervised financial organization: A 
person or organization . . . (a) organized 
chartered, or holding an authorized certifi-
cate under the laws of this state . . . which 
authorize the person to make loans and to 
receive deposits, including a savings share 
certificate or deposit account, and (b) sub-
ject to supervision by an official or agency 
of this state or of the United States. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70B-1-301 (17). 
The Comment to Section 70B-1-301(13) explains how supervised 
financial organizations such as Grove Finance were to be regulated: 
This definition defines the class of lenders 
which may engage in the business of making 
supervised loans . . . without being licensed 
under the Act by the Administrator, Section 
3.501 and 3.502 [UCCC]. If a lender of this 
class is subject to supervision by an official 
or agency other than the Administrator, the 
power of examination, investigation and 
enforcement under this Act may be exercised by 
that official or agency. Section 6.105. This 
class of lender typically includes persons 
authorized to make loans and receive deposits 
or their equivalent such as commercial banks, 
savings banks, savings and loan associations 
and credit unions. Comment Section 70B-1-
301(17). 
In summary, the substance and structure of Title 7OB 
shows that the commissioners1 duties to investigate, examine and 
supervise Grove Finance were not done away with by the passage of 
Title 70B. The commissioners always had the duties set forth in 
Title 7. In addition, because Grove Finance was a supervised 
lender, the commissioners had a duty to examine and investigate 
9 
Grove Finance under Utah Code Ann, § 70B-3-506(1). See, Appel-
lants1 Opening Brief pp. 24-25. 
POINT II 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IS 
CONSIDERED AS A FORM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR AS AN 
ELEMENT IN A NEGLIGENCE CASE, THE DOCTRINE DOES 
NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS 
A. Introduction. 
Many States which have adopted the "general duty" versus 
"special duty" dichotomy acknowledge that the Public Duty Doctrine 
is a branch of sovereign immunity. That is, there is sovereign or 
governmental immunity when the duty is only owed to the public in 
general. But, there can be sovereign or governmental liability 
when the duty breached is owed to a particular person. E.g. , 
Henderson v. St. Petersburg, 247 So.2d 23 (Fla. App. 1971); Simp-
son's Food Fair Inc. v. Evansville, 272 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. App. 
1971). 
States which accept the public duty doctrine as a form of 
governmental immunity do so because "to hold otherwise would expose 
the government to liability for practically every action taken." 
57 Am. Jur.2d Municipal, Etc., Tort Liability, § 141 at 154 (1988) . 
If the Public Duty Doctrine is a branch of sovereign immunity, then 
the Governmental Immunity Act, as it existed at the time these 
claims arose, repealed such immunity. (Appellants brief pp. 33-
34) . However, the commissioners argue that the Public Duty 
10 
Doctrine is not a branch of sovereign immunity. They claim the 
Public Duty Doctrine simply means that there is no duty, a required 
element in a negligence case. A review of Utah case law suggests 
the commissioners1 analysis is wrong. 
B. The Public Duty Doctrine in Utah. 
The public duty doctrine was accepted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Obrav v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971). In 
Obray, the court applied the doctrine to shield an officer for 
failing to investigate a burglary. The primary ground for the 
court's ruling was the statute of limitations. However, in the 
last paragraph of the opinion, the court said that the duty to 
investigate was a discretionary duty owed to the public. Thus, the 
Public Duty Doctrine was linked with traditional discretionary 
conduct sovereign immunity: 
[W]e believe that defendants1 contention that 
failure by a public sheriff to investigate a 
crime claimed by an individual to have been 
committed, ordinarily is a matter of judgment 
and discretion, not actionable or compensable, 
and not pursuable by an individual since the 
public official's duty is to the public. . . 
Obrav at 19. 
Thereafter, in Christenson v. Havward, 694 P. 2d 612 (Utah 
1984) , this court used the Public Duty Doctrine to shield an 
officer from liability for failing to arrest an intoxicated motor-
cyclist. However, the court did not state whether its decision was 
based on negligence or immunity analysis. 
11 
Subsequently, in Ferree v. State. 784 P. 2d 149 (Utah 
1989) the court applied the public duty doctrine to shield correc-
tions officers from liability for failing to supervise a man who 
committed murder while away from a halfway house. Initially, the 
opinion suggests a negligence analysis: 
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a 
plaintiff must first establish a duty of care 
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. 
Ferree, at 151. 
However, the real reason for applying the public duty 
doctrine is revealed later in the opinion: 
It would expose the state to potentially every 
wrong that flows from the necessary programs 
of rehabilitation and paroling of prisoners. . 
the effect could well be to burden 
corrections officials and chill legitimate 
rehabilitative programs. . . . The public 
interest would not be served by imposing 
liability on corrections officials and the 
state. . . . (Emphasis added.) Ferree v. 
State, at 151. 
The rationale set forth in Ferree is not compatible with 
duty analysis in a negligence case. The essential question in 
negligence duty analysis is whether the plaintiff's interests are 
entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct. Duty 
is an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled 
to protection. W. L. Prosser, Law of Torts 3 25, 32 6 (4th ed. 
1971). Thus, whether a duty exists in a negligence case depends 
upon numerous factors. One is the relationship of the parties. 
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Another is whether one assumes responsibility for the safety of 
property or deprives a person of self protection. DCR Inc. v. Peek 
Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983); Beach v. University of Utah, 
726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). Foreseeability of harm is another 
important factor. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1974) . In addition, a statute can impose duties. These factors 
were not considered in Ferree. Instead, Ferree1s public duty 
analysis is nearly identical to the following sovereign immunity 
analysis set forth in Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Institutions, 
782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989): 
To provide the utmost public protection, 
governmental entitles should not be dissuaded 
from engaging in such activities by the fear 
that liability may be imposed if an employee 
performs his duties inadequately. Moreover, if 
liability existed for this type of activity, 
the risk exposure to which a public entity 
would be subject would include virtually all 
activities going on within the community. Id. 
at 513. 
In summary, this court's acceptance of the Public Duty 
Doctrine is based on sovereign immunity — not negligence. There-
fore, the public duty doctrine form of common law immunity was 
repealed by the Governmental Immunity Act as it existed at the time 
the depositors sued the commissioners for their gross negligence. 
C. Public Duty as an Element in a Negligence Case. 
Even if the Public Duty Doctrine is viewed as an element 
of negligence analysis, the Public Duty Doctrine does not shield 
the commissioners from the claims of the depositors. 
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As previously stated, whether a duty exists depends upon 
numerous factors. When applied to this case, numerous factors 
create a duty to investigate, examine and supervise Grove Finance 
for the protection of the depositors. Special relationships exist. 
(Appellants' Brief pp. 2 6 - 27.) The banking laws establish the 
duty. (Point I, supra.) It was foreseeable that the depositors 
would be harmed if the commissioners did not investigate, examine 
and supervise Grove Finance. Moreover, the depositors, relying on 
the state to regulate Grove Finance, could not protect themselves. 
POINT III 
GOOD FAITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR 
THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS 
A. Introduction. 
The commissioners argue that common law good faith 
qualified immunity bars the depositors1 claims because Section 63-
30-4(2) allows for common law immunity; and the decision whether to 
supervise Grove Finance under Title 7 or 7OB is a discretionary 
decision, so the commissioners cannot be sued. 
However, Section 63-30-4(2) was passed by the legislature 
in 1982 after the depositors brought this action. Further, whether 
to regulate Grove Finance under Title 7 or Title 70B is not a dis-
cretionary decision. Even if it was, factual issues would preclude 
a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings. 
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B. At the Time the Claims of the Depositors Arose, the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act Repealed Common Law Forms of 
Immunity Including "Good Faith Qualified Immunity." 
The concept of good faith qualified immunity is a common 
law form of sovereign immunity. See, Utah State University v. SutrO 
& Co., 646 P.2d 715, 721 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. Granite School 
District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 407, 413 P.2d 597 (1966). 
The passage of a Governmental Immunity Act may amend or 
repeal common law concepts of governmental immunity. C.f., Hansen 
v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (1990). 
The commissioners argue that common law good faith 
qualified immunity was not repealed because one year after the 
depositors filed this action, the legislature passed Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-4(2): 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
as adversely affecting any immunity from suit 
which a governmental entity or employee may 
otherwise assert under statute or federal law. 
This is not the first time the commissioners have sought 
to retroactively apply Governmental Immunity Act amendments to 
shield them from liability. In Madsen II, the court refused to 
retroactively apply Governmental Immunity Act amendments. It held 
t~hat the Governmental Immunity Act as it existed in 1980, not 1982, 
must be applied to this case. Madsen II at 252. 
C. The Commissioners1 Duties Were Not Discretionary. 
The depositors, in their opening brief, showed that each 
of the numerous and specific statutory duties set forth in Title 7 
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and Title 7OB were mandatory duties that are not discretionary. 
Appellants' Brief pp. 37-38. The commissioners respond that the 
decision to regulate Grove Finance under Title 7 or Title 70B is 
discretionary so the depositors can't sue the commissioners for 
gross negligence in failing to perform the specific duties set 
forth in Title 7 and Title 70B. 
The Commissioners' response is contrary to Title 7 and 
Title 70B as set forth in Point I of this brief. Title 70B 
compliments Title 7. It does not replace Title 7. There was no 
decision, discretionary or otherwise, for the commissioners to 
make. They were obligated to perform the duties set forth in both 
Title 7 and Title 70B. 
Further, even if the commissioners could choose to 
regulate Grove Finance under one title to the exclusion of the 
other, that choice does not excuse the commissioners from per-
forming the ministerial duties contained in the title selected by 
the commissioners. 
Finally, the depositors are suing the commissioners for 
failing to perform the statutory duties required to implement the 
policies set forth in Utah's then existing banking law and the 
UCCC. Decisions or actions implementing a pre-existing policy are 
not discretionary functions. Hansen, supra at 84 6. Moreover, 
whether the decisions and actions implement a pre-existing policy 
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is a factual issue precluding a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. Id. 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NO GROUNDS FOR 
DENYING CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
The commissioners, in their brief, argue that the lower 
court properly denied class action status to this litigation 
because the statute of limitations bars the claims of the unnamed 
depositors. 
[T]ime barred claims are not revived by their 
assertion in a class action. (Appellees1 Brief 
p. 32.) 
However, the depositors1 claims are not time barred. The 
depositors commenced this litigation as a class action against 
Brimhall and Borthick. In Madsen II, this court ruled that no 
statute of limitations urged by the commissioners bars the claims. 
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), 
the United States Supreme Court held that the filing of a class 
action tolls the running of any applicable statute of limitations 
for all asserted members of the class. Thus, the filing of the 
class action by the depositors completely tolls any statute of 
limitations. 
Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court in Crown Cork 
& Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), held that an applicable 
statute of limitations was tolled during the period that there was 
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a pending class action in which the plaintiff was a putative class 
member. Id. at 344. Subsequent to American Pipe and Crown Cork, 
federal courts have applied the holdings of these two cases to rule 
that the statute of limitations is tolled until the appellate court 
rules or refuses to rule on the class action status issue. West 
Haven School District v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 721 F.Supp. 1547 
(D. Conn. 1988); see, Byrd v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 675 
F.Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987); c.f., Barkman v. Wabash, Inc., 674 
F.Supp. 623 (N.D. 111. 1987). 
Thus, any possible statute of limitations is tolled until 
a final decision is reached by this court on the class action 
certification issue. It was clear error for the lower court to 
deny class action certification on the erroneous belief that the 
claims were time barred. 
POINT V 
THE DEPOSITORS MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
REQUIRED BY RULE 2 3 
The commissioners, in their brief, correctly argue: 
In seeking class certification, the appel-
lants1 bear the burden of establishing that 
the cause of action merits treatment of a 
class action. (Appellees' Brief at 30.) 
However, the commissioners fail to explain what that burden is. In 
truth, the burden is light and the depositors met it. 
Rule 23 is a procedural device invoked in the first 
instance by a complaint and maintained by a court order which 
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applies the Rule 23 criteria. Accordingly, a class action arises 
prima facie from a well pleaded complaint. A properly plead 
complaint shifts to the opposing party the burden to show 
otherwise. 2 H.B. Newberg, Newbera on Class Actions § 7.17 at 3 5 
(Rev. ed. 1988) (hereinafter "Newberg § at " ) . In other 
words, the plaintiff has the burden under notice pleading to plead 
or otherwise establish certain basic class facts in the complaint 
such as the approximate size of the class and why joinder is 
impractical. The plaintiff must also plead that common questions 
of fact or law predominate the litigation. In addition, judicial 
notice and/or common sense assumptions by the court may create 
rebuttable presumptions that the Rule 23 criteria are met. Newberg 
§ 7.19 at 38. 
Specifically, once the plaintiff pleads or shows 
numerosity or impracticability of joinder, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show lack of numerosity, or practicability of joinder. 
Newberg § 7.22 at 44. 
Similarly, once the plaintiff pleads or otherwise 
establishes common questions, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
disprove common questions of fact and law. Newberg § 7.23. 
In addition, adequate representation is usually presumed 
when, as in this case, there is an absence of contrary evidence. 
Newberg § 7.24 at 48, 49. 
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As set forth in the Appellants1 Brief pp. 4 5 - 47, the 
elements required by Rule 2 3 were pled and established by the 
depositors. Moreover, the commissioners, in the lower court, did 
not contest the class action facts. In short, the depositors met 
the burden required by Rule 23. 
POINT VI 
RES JUDICATA IS NO BASIS FOR DENYING 
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
A. Introduction. 
The commissioners, in their brief, allege that the class 
of unnamed depositors cannot sue the commissioners for gross 
negligence because of Hilton v. Borthick, supra. In Hilton, the 
depositors sued the State and Borthick in his official capacity for 
failing to properly inspect and regulate Grove Finance. The 
depositors lost simply because this court, in a 3-2 decision, ruled 
that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act provided immunity to the 
State and to Borthick in his official capacity. Now Borthick says 
that because he won in Hilton, the claims preclusion branch of res 
judicata means that he wins against all other depositors except the 
named depositors in this action. He claims the court was correct 
in not certifying the class. 
However, claims preclusion does not apply in this case 
because the parties are not identical. Further, the depositors1 
claims for gross negligence were not, should not and could not have 
been presented in Hilton. 
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B. The Parties are not Identical. 
In Hilton, the defendants were the State and Borthick in 
his official capacity. In this case, the defendants are Brimhall 
and Borthick in their individual capacities. The parties simply 
are not identical and are not treated in the same fashion. As 
explained in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Brown, 605 S.W.2d 497, 499 
(Ky. 1980): 
[Governmental bodies simply are not the same 
animals as individuals. . . . As a result, the 
traditional duty analysis applied in actions 
for negligence against individuals is not ap-
propriate in suits against government . . . . 
C. The Claims for Gross Negligence Against Brimhall and Borthick 
Were not Brought in Hilton Nor Should They Have Been. 
In Hilton v. Borthick, supraf and in Gillman v. Dept. of 
Financial Institutions, supra, this court ruled that the State and 
a commissioner in his official capacity were protected by Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act. In contrast, in this litigation (Madsen 
II), this court ruled that the commissioners, in their individual 
capacities, are not entitled to immunity under Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act. Therefore, claims for gross negligence against the 
individual commissioners should be litigated in this action. 
In summary, the depositors1 claims against the state 
should have been and were litigated against the state in Hilton. 
However, the depositors claims against individual defendants for 
gross negligence could and should be litigated in this action. 
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POINT VII 
THE ISSUES CONCEDED OR NOT BRIEFED BY 
THE COMMISSIONERS REQUIRE A REVERSAL 
A. Introduction. 
Many of the issues raised in the depositors' brief were 
not responded to by the commissioners. (See, pp. 5-6, supra.) 
Apparently Brimhall and Borthick concede these issues to the 
depositors. C.f., Roberts v. Sawyer, 252 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 
1958); United States v. White, 454 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1971); Leer 
v. Murphv, 844 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1988). 
B. Public Duty Issues. 
In their opening brief, the depositors showed that the 
Public Duty Doctrine does not bar their claims because a special 
relationship existed between the depositors and the commissioners 
and a special relationship existed between the State and Grove 
Finance. The commissioners wholly failed to brief the special 
relationships issues. 
The depositors1 brief also argued that the application of 
the Public Duty Doctrine, in this case, is contrary to the holding 
of Madsen II. The commissioners1 response is silence. 
The depositors also showed that res judicata precludes 
the commissioners from raising the public duty doctrine. The 
commissioners failed to respond to this dispositive issue. 
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C. Statute of Limitations Issues, 
The depositors argued, on the basis of Matheson v. 
Pearson 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
25(2), a four year statute of limitations, governs this case. The 
commissioners, in their brief, failed to respond. 
In addition, the depositors cited authority that any 
applicable statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
depositors lost their funds. The commissioners1 response was, 
again, silence. 
D. Common Law Qualified Immunity Issues. 
The depositors, submitted that common law qualified 
immunity cannot be grounds for a summary judgment or judgment on 
the pleadings because the issue of whether the commissioners 
performed their duties honestly and in good faith is a factual 
issue. The commissioners did not respond to this argument. 
E. Class Action Issues. 
In their brief, the depositors showed that this 
litigation meets the requirements of U.R.C.P. 23. The depositors 
also showed that it is reversible error for a court to consider 
factors other than those found in U.R.C.P. 23. The commissioners 
do not brief these issues. 
Finally, the depositors showed how it is reversible error 
for the lower court not to state any reasons for its failure to 
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certify the litigation as a class action. The commissioners did 
not brief this issue. 
F. Conclusion. 
These dispositive issues were not briefed by the commis-
sioners. These issues in and of themselves require reversal of the 
lower court judgement. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
In Madsen II, this court ruled that no statute of 
limitations barred the depositors1 claim, and that the depositors 
could sue Brimhall and Borthick, as individuals, for gross 
negligence. The lower court's judgment on the pleadings and 
summary judgment is contrary to the Madsen II ruling. Further, the 
court committed clear error by refusing to certify this litigation 
as a class action. For these reasons, the judgments of the lower 
court should be reversed and this case remanded with instructions 
to certify this litigation as a class action. 
DATED this IJ day of April, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
By: ZjsJ^^TtM& 
^EDWARD T . WELLS 
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APPENDIX 
7-2-1 BANKS AND BANKING 
the banking department, or who knowingly or willfully makes any false 
statement concerning any such bank or institution, or who is guilty of 
any misconduct or corruption in office is guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
is punishable accordingly, and m addition thereto shall be removed from 
office by the governor. 
History C. L 1917, § 1017x4, added by Conateral References. 
L 1918, en IS, § 1 ; E. S. 1933 & C. 1943, Personal liability of members of *rov. 
7-1-29. ernmental banking department or their 
sureties, 3S A L. R. 66C, 90 A. L. R. 1423. 
CHAPTER 2 
SUSPENSION AND LIQUIDATION 
Section 7 2 1 When commissioner may take possession. 
7 2 2 Jurisdiction of district coun 
7-2 3. Proceedings bv commissioner may be enjoined. 
7 2-4 Resumption of business. 
7 2-3 Receiver or assignee for creditors—Commissioner may succeed. 
7-2-6. Claims—Notice to creditors. 
7-2-7. Objection to claims—Trial of issues. 
7-2-8. Claims incurred after commissioner takes possession. 
7 2-9 Rejection of claims—Action on—Limitations—Payment. 
7 2-10. Inventory—List of claims—Reports of liquidation. 
7-2-11. Special agents—Appointment and bond 
7 2-3 2 Liouidation—Powers and duties of commissioners 
7 2-13. Liquidation—Deposit of assets in banks—Preference 
7 2-34. Expenses m liquidation of institutions 
7-2-15. Preferences generally forbidden—Exceptions. 
7-2-16. Dividends. 
7-2-17 to 7-2-22. Repealed. 
7 2-2°> Winding up—Election of procedure 
7 2-24. Procedure when liquidation continued uncle* commissioner. 
7-2-25 Procedure when liquidation continued under agents. 
7-2-26 Duties and powers of liquidating agents. 
7 2 27. Death or removal of liquidating apent. 
7 2 28. Records of liquidation to be deposited in court. 
7 2 29 Reorganization by depositors—Petition—Hearing—Notice—Objections 
—Procedure 
7 2 30. Transfer of assets to depositors or liquidating corporation—Conditions 
precedent. 
7 2 31 Corrmissioner to advise with depositors' committee 
7 . 3 _ Clearing nouse certificates—Powers of bank commissioner 
7-2-1. When commissioner may take possession—Tne Dank commissior-
or>
 m?y fortiwt* Take possession or + he business ard p^on^t^ of any ir . 
<*' tutioi under ms supervision ui»enp\er n snail appear trial such institu-
tion 
' I ) Has violated its articles of incorporation or any law applicable 
thereto 
(2) Is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner, 
or is practicing deception upon its members or the public, or is pursuing 
a plan which is injurious to its members, 
(o^ Is not m sound and safe condition to transact its business; 
(4) Has had an impairment of its capital for a period of ninety days: 
SUSPENSION AND LIQUIDATION 7-2-2 
(5) lias refused to pay its depositors in accordance with the terms 
on which the deposits were received, or lias become otherwise insolvent; 
(G) Has neglected or refused to comply with the terms of a duly and 
legally authorized order issued by the bank commissioner; 
(7) Has refused, upon proper demand, to submit its records and affairs 
for inspection to an examiner of the banking department; or, 
(8) Whenever it shall appear that its officers have refused to be 
examined under oath regarding its affairs. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 23, $ 1 ; 1925, ch. 
42, §17; 1925. ch. 116, §8;*1929, ch. 95, 
§ l ; f c E. S. 1933 k C. 1943, 7-2-1. 
Cross-Beference. 
Change of name of state banking de-
partment and bank commissioner to de-
partment of financial institutions and com-
missioner of financial institutions, 7-1-1.1, 
7-1-1.2. 
Construction and. application. 
The failure t o ' p a y the "fees" imposed 
by section 7-1-10 is not made a ground for 
t;\k\tvg possession of t h t business and 
propertv of anv institution. Commercial 
Bank of Utah v. State, 121 XL 576, 244 P. 
2d 3C4. 
Manner of taking possession by commis-
sioner. 
The commissioner may take possession 
nnder this section without aid of the court. 
Riches v. Hadlock, 80 U. 2C5; 15 P. 2d 283. 
Nature of liquidation proceeding. 
A proceeding for the suspension or 
liquidation of any of the institutions 
placed under the supervision of the bank-
ing department is an adversary proceed-
ing. Such a proceeding, however, should 
not be confused with a proceeding to 
dissolve the association or forfeit its 
charter. The differences are manifest. The 
tact that suspension and liquidation may 
result in practical dissolution is of no 
moment. Tripp v. Third Judicial District 
Lourt, b£ I", b. 5G P. 2d 1355. 
Preferential rights of state. 
Wiiere assets? of insolvent state bank 
with state funds on deposit had passed 
into lianas of commissioner for purpose ot 
winding up oank's affairs for beneht of its 
creditors before state asserted its prefer-
ential right by virtue of common law, such 
right was lost, and surety for repayment 
of funds was not entitled to priority. Na-
tional Surety Co. v. Pixton, 60 V. 289, 208 
P. 87S, 24 A. L. B.1487. 
Status and position of commissioner. 
The commissioner, in taking possession 
under the authority of this section, is a 
public officer or agent of the state and 
derives his powers wholly from the stat-
ute; he is not an officer of the court, for 
he takes possession of the property of 
the institution and holds it without the 
aid of. and despite, judicial action; there-
fore his custody of the property is not, as 
is the custody of a court receiver, the 
custody of the court. In short, he is a 
mere executive creature of the statute, not 
of the court, and can exercise only such 
powers as the statute has given him. 
Riches v. Hadlock, 80 V. 265, 15 P. 2d 
283. 
The commissioner is \ery different from 
a chancery receiver. Nor is he a statutory 
receiver with all of the powers of a chan-
cery receiver. The marked dissimilarity 
between the two is forcibly pointed out 
at 80 U. 278 bv Mr. Justice Straup. 
Riches v. Hadlock,' SO U. 205, 15 P. 2d 2S3. 
When an action in suspension or liquida-
tion is instituted by commissioner, in many 
ways he occupies, as to the corporation, 
the* position of plaintiff, representing cred-
itors, stockholders, members, or otnerh hav-
ing interests in the institution, while the 
corporation occupies tiie position of de-
fendant. Trix>p v. Third Juoicial District 
Lour:. SP V. 2d 
Collateral Eeferences. 
BanKs and BankingC=>G33-l>. 
I CJLS. Banks and Banking §422, 
insolvency generally, 10 Am. Jur . 
710 et seq.. Banks § 754 et seq. 
2d 
7-2-2. Jurisdiction of district court.—The district court in and for the 
county in which such institution or the principal office thereof is situated 
shall have jurisdiction in the liquidation of the afifairs of such institution 
under the provisions of this chapter. 
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COMMERCIAL AND SAVINGS HANKS AND BANKING 7-3-4 
A's of tlie United States, and to all corporations transacting a banking 
siness in Ibis state, unless tbc context otherwise requires. 
History: L. 1911, ch. 25, § 42; C. L. 1017, Collateral References. 
015; R. S. 1033 * C. 19431 7-3.1.
 1;. l l lkj. Slllil }iaiikino<^=>4. 
_ , <• ('..I.S. Banks and Banking S C. 
oss-Refercnce. * * 
Change of name of Btate l i n k i n g do- Statute regulating hanks and trust coin-
rtiwiit and hank commissioner to de- panics as special or class K-gislation, ur as 
rtint-iit of financial institution* and m m - ,l (.,,ving the- equal protection of the law*, 
ssiniKT of financial instil utitmh, 7-1-1.1, 111 A 1 11 140 
•1.2. 
7-3-2. Chapter applies to both savings and commercial banks.—All the 
neral powers and privileges, as well as the general restrictions and 
illations, provided for in this chapter and applying to the corporations 
rranized and regulated hereunder under the general designation "banks" 
nil be understood and construed to apply to and govern commercial 
nks and savings banks, and those combining both of such branches of 
e banking business. 
rlistory: L. 1011, ch. 25, §43; C. L. 
17, § 1016; R. S. 1933 L C. 1943, 7-8-2. 
7-3-3. "Banking business" defined.—Any corporation holding itself out 
the public as receiving money on deposit, whether evidenced by eerti-
ate, promissory note or otherwise, shall be considered as doing a banking 
siness and shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter as to such 
siness. 
History: L. 1911, eh. 25, $ 3 9 ; C. L. 1917, l*rfiuiiinns*, In Am. .1 ur. !M S.'-iS. Banks 
012; R. S. 1933 k C. 1912, 7-3-3. §§ ]-.'i. 
Jss-Eeferences. Wh.-jt is a "l.ank" or " l i n k e r " within 
tanking department within department tin- tYdri;il rcvnim- ncls, l.'ii« A. L. B. 
business regulation, ]:;•]•]«. 107;";. 
\il»tu*tion ;i(|riici<'S. hanks :%ui\ trust 
npnnicb exempt from art r«-l:;tiug to, Law Reviews. 
1-7. Banking under the A nti-Trust Laws, 
Adulf A. lierU., Jr., 4i» Colum. L. Bev. 58i». 
[lateral References.
 U t „ . A T l l l . o r y a i l J n a l , i ; ing Brartiro, 
tanks and B:nikingC=>2. Wilbcrl Ward, ?.!' Virginia L. how T.'iu. 
» C B S . Banks and Banking g 1. 
7-3-4. Foreign corporations to comply with local law.—No foreign eor-
ralion shall transact a banking business in this state without first coniply-
r with all the requirements of the laws of this state relating to banks 
d to the conduct of the banking business as provided in this chapter, nor 
thout having complied with the other laws of this state relating to foreign 
rporations. 
history: L. 1911, ch. 25, 5 1 8 ; C. L. Limitations on foreign hanking corpora-
L7, §995; E. S. 1933 & C. 1942, 7-3-4. l ions, in Am. dur. 2d 34, Banks J £'. 
Llateral References. National bank acting as executor, ail-
tanks an»l BankingC=>lS. miii istmtor, trustee, or guaniian ah sub-
> (J..1.S. Banks and Banking § .17. jn-t tu stall- law in aiBuinistrat ion of es-
tate, S." A. L. B. St>4. 
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